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Abstract: This paper studies the short-run transmission of foreign shocks in a small open
economy with capital controls and a ¯xed exchange rate. Capital controls alter the trans-
mission of shocks because endogenous changes in the domestic nominal interest rate a®ect
savings and investment decisions. The economy's reaction to export shocks hinges on how
the government chooses to restrict capital °ows; that is, whether in°ows or out°ows are re-
stricted. For foreign interest rate shocks, private capital °ows are important, but so are the
government's holdings of foreign exchange reserves. Finally, a simple graphical apparatus is
developed to provide a contrast to the case when capital °ows are unrestricted.
JEL Classi¯cation: E58, F32, F41.
Keywords: Capital Controls, Foreign Shocks.
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The exchange rate regime and degree of capital mobility take centre stage when thinking
about an economy's exposure to foreign shocks. Recently, a number of attempts have been
made to either develop, or improve on, the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Exchange Restrictions, which provides dejure measures for both of these. Along one
dimension, Reinhart and Rogo® (2004) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) present
defacto classi¯cations of exchange rate regimes.1 Along the other, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti's
(2001, 2006) work, documenting countries' net external wealth positions, leads to a defacto
index of capital account openness. These studies show that, although ¯nancial market
integration has risen, capital controls, in one form or another, are still used in a majority of
countries. Capital controls are also often used to support a managed exchange rate.2 Given
this, it is an important task to understand exactly how capital controls a®ect an economy's
reaction to foreign shocks.3
This paper uses a sticky-price model of a small open economy to investigate the short-run
transmission of foreign shocks, when the exchange rate is ¯xed, and the government imposes
a capital control. The capital control is introduced through a separate exchange rate ap-
plied to ¯nancial transactions; that is, a dual exchange rate system. It is well-known that
dual exchange rates and capital controls are formally equivalent, but an important contribu-
tion of this paper is to show that by integrating capital controls into a model with nominal
rigidities, monopolistic competition, and physical capital, there is also an equivalence be-
tween the textbook Mundell-Fleming and DGE approaches.4 Without capital controls, a
balance-of-payments condition, similar to that presented in C¶ espedes et al. (2004), deter-
mines investment behavior, consumption is pinned down by an investment-savings condition,
and when prices are sticky, output is determined by current levels of demand. When the
exchange rate is ¯xed, money demand determines the level of money supply residually. With
capital controls, investment demand is decreasing in the domestic interest rate. Given the
1Reinhart and Rogo® (2004) argue that 50% of o±cial pegs °oat through the use of dual exchange rates,
whereas Levy-Yeyati and Sturzennegger (2005) cite hidden pegs and fear of °oating as prevalent.
2Alesina et al. (1993) discuss the political economy aspects of this situation.
3Miniane (2004) develops a detailed dejure measure of capital account restrictions and Miniane and
Rogers (2007) use this to assess whether capital controls insulate domestic countries' interest rates from U.S.
monetary shocks.
4This intertemporal equivalence is ¯rst shown in Adams and Greenwood (1985). I use the terms `dual
exchange rates' and `capital controls' interchangably.
1investment-savings relationship, and sticky prices, investment demand is increasing in out-
put; or rather, the balance-of-payments relationship is `upward-sloped'. In addition to the
usual national intertemporal budget constraint, a period national budget constraint, link-
ing government reserves to the °ow of private capital, is also required to hold when there
are capital controls. Because the money supply is tied to the °ow of government reserves,
money demand becomes central in determining the equilibrium, even if the exchange rate
is ¯xed. Thus, the DGE model developed here, generates familiar looking IS, BP, and LM
conditions, when there are capital controls. The important di®erence is that household
and ¯rm conditions are derived from optimizing behavior, and the private sector distortions
and public sector revenues that capital controls introduce are accounted for through budget
constraints.
Two foreign shocks are studied; export shocks and foreign interest rate shocks. The key
mechanism that alters the reaction of the economy to these shocks is the (endogenous) change
in the domestic nominal interest rate. An adverse shock to exports, taken to represent lower
global demand for the domestic commodity - or, more loosely, a tari® imposed on sales -
reduces GDP by more than it does with unrestricted capital °ows, whenever the government
imposes a capital out°ow. In this case, investment reacts by more than output because, to
force the out°ow of private capital, the government needs to allow the domestic interest rate
to rise. This reinforces the negative e®ects of the shock and, in this sense, capital controls
add to the variability of output. Regardless of the restriction on the °ow of capital, the
domestic interest rate and investment fall when the foreign interest rate rises. However, the
reaction of consumption depends explicitly on the target the government sets for the capital
account, and also its holdings of foreign exchange reserves. Only when the country is neither
a net creditor nor debtor internationally is the result unambiguous: consumption is insulated
from the shock. When this special case does not hold, consumption may rise or fall with the
shock, depending on whether the economy is a net creditor or debtor, respectively. Thus,
the often assumed insulation properties of capital controls with regard to GDP and foreign
interest rate shocks fail to hold, and the governments holdings of foreign exchange reserves
are important for determining the co-movement of macro aggregates.
There is a related literature that studies capital controls in economies with money. The
Mundell-Fleming framework emphasizes insulation from foreign interest rate shocks, and
the possibility of independent monetary policy. However, using a portfolio-balance ap-
proach, Marion (1981), for example, shows that insulation occurs only as a special case,
2and Aizenman (1985) shows that limited capital mobility does not necessarily increase the
scope for monetary policy, when the exchange rate is ¯xed. Both the Mundell-Fleming
and portfolio-balance model o®er useful but limited insights. This is particularly true of
the former because it does not account for the °ow of net foreign assets. Studies based on
this framework cannot disentangle the in°ow and out°ow of reserves and neither can they
explain the implications of temporary capital account restrictions. More closely related
to the analysis here, Guidotti and V¶ egh (1992) analyze capital controls in an explicitly in-
tertemporal framework. However, in the representative agent economy they develop output
is exogenous. More recently, Calvo et al. (1995) and Reinhart and Smith (2002) study
the intertemporal implications of capital controls in economies with traded and non-traded
goods.5 Finally, C¶ espedes et al. (2004) and Lahiri et al. (2006) study the optimality of
di®erent exchange rate regimes when capital market imperfections arise in the private sec-
tor. The former, incorporates liability dollarization, whereas Lahiri et al. (2006) introduce
exogenously segmented asset markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the model economy.
Section three develops a simple representation of the equilibrium conditions of the model and
section four studies the reaction of the economy to export and foreign interest rate shocks.
Section ¯ve concludes.
2. The Model Economy
There is a small domestic economy and a large foreign economy, which exist for two periods.6
Other than their size the domestic and foreign economies are identical.
A. Firms
There are two types of domestic ¯rms; those producing a homogenous ¯nal good and those
producing a di®erentiated intermediate good.7 Final good ¯rms have access to the following
5Mendoza (1991) provides an analysis of capital controls in a business cycle model of a small open
economy with technology shocks. The obvious drawback of omitting money is that once the capital account
is regulated, so is the current account.
6It would be possible to extend the analysis to an in¯nite horizon if I were interested in examining the
implications for the length of the capital account restrictions. See Frenkel and Razin (1986) for an analysis
of these considerations.
7The analysis of this section draws on the open economy macroeconomics literature that stresses the use







n (1 ¡ n)
1¡n (1)
where zt is the ¯nal good, and yh;t and yf;t are aggregate bundles of the intermediate goods,
produced in the domestic and foreign economies respectively. These ¯rms maximize pro¯ts,
Ptzt¡Ph;tyh;t¡Pf;tyf;t, choosing yh;t and yf;t, subject to (1), implying the demand functions
for domestic and foreign intermediate goods are,
yh;t = zt(Pt=Ph;t)n (2)
yf;t = zt(Pt=Pf;t)(1 ¡ n) (3)
where Pt ´ P n
h;tP
1¡n
f;t is the consumer price index (CPI) and Ph;t is the price of the domestic
intermediate good. Foreign ¯rms face the same problem, but because of the asymmetry
introduced by the small open economy assumption n¤ ! 0. In this case, the foreign version
of (1) implies z¤
t » = y¤
f;t, and the corresponding foreign CPI is P ¤
t » = P ¤
f;t, which is exogenous.
This does not mean exports are zero, because z¤
t itself is large. Using a law of one price
assumption, Ph;t = etP ¤








tn¤ is restricted to be non-zero and ¯nite, and is exogenous from the viewpoint
of the domestic economy. Export demand depends explicitly on the relative price.
The aggregate bundle of intermediate goods is produced using a constant elasticity of sub-








where yh;t(j) is the jth intermediate input and the parameter µ > 1 measures the substitution
elasticity between types. Pro¯ts, Ph;tyh;t ¡
R 1
0 Ph;t(j)yh;t(j)dj, are maximized, choosing
yh;t(j), subject to (5). The solution to this problem implies a downward sloping input







is the corresponding price index, derived from the zero
pro¯t condition.
4The di®erentiated intermediate goods are produced using competitively supplied domestic







where ° + ® = 1, kt is capital, lt is the labor input, and yt(j) = yh;t(j) + y¤
h;t(j) is domestic
GDP. Intermediate good ¯rms maximize pro¯ts,
R 1
0 Ph;t(j)yt(j)dj ¡wtlt(j)¡Qtkt, choosing
kt;lt(j), and Ph;t(j), where wt are nominal wages, and Qt is the nominal rental rate of capital,
such that (6) and (7) hold.
Cost minimization implies factor demands can be written as,
kt=lt(j) = [(1 ¡ ®)=®]wt=Qt (8)
Given factor demand, ¯rm j sets the price of it's good as a mark-up over marginal cost,
mct.8 In equilibrium, intermediate good ¯rms set the same price,
Ph;t = [µ=(µ ¡ 1)]Et¡1 fmctg for t = 0;1 (9)
where µ=(µ ¡ 1) > 1 is the monopoly markup.9
B. Households
Domestic households choose foreign nominal bond and domestic nominal money holdings,
consumption, labor supply, and investment. Suppressing the j index, households maximize,
U = u(C0;m0;l0) + ¯u(C1;m1;l1)







= #t + wtlt + Qtkt ¡ Pt (Ct + xt) ¡ Mt + Mt¡1 ¡ Tt (10)
xt = kt+1 (11)
for t = 0;1. Above, ¯ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor, Ct is total consumption, mt ´ Mt=Pt
are real money balances, xt is investment, so that Ptxt represents nominal expenditure on
8Constant returns to scale in production and perfectly competitive factor markets imply kt=lt(j) = kt=lt




9I write this expression with an expectations operator because although the t = 1 version holds exactly the




and that the price setting equation can be expressed as, Ph;t = [µ=®(µ ¡ 1)]Et¡1 fwtlt=ytg.
5capital, and #t are monopoly pro¯ts from the production of the di®erentiated intermediate
good. The foreign net nominal interest rate is i¤
t, st is the ¯nancial exchange rate, Bt
are foreign currency bonds, so that ¢Bt represents the change in foreign assets holdings
of individual j. Finally, Tt is a nominal lump-sum government tax. In (11), it has been
assumed, for simplicity, that capital depreciates completely in production.
I specialize period utility to u = lnCt + aln(Mt=Pt) ¡ ·lt, where a > 0 is a measure of
monetary frictions and · > 0 is the weight attached to the dis-utility of labor. The ¯rst-
order conditions imply,
P1C1 = ¯P0C0 (1 + i0) (12)
wt = ·PtCt for t = 0;1 (13)
P1C1 = ¯C0Q1 (14)
M0 = aP0C0 (1 + i0)=i0 (15)
M1 = aP1C1 (16)
Equation (12) is the consumption Euler equation, (13) represents labor supply, and (14) the
optimal choice of capital.10 Equations (15) and (16) express the demand for money, where
money held in the terminal period is independent of the interest rate.
Of the two exchange rates, the ¯nancial exchange rate, st, is important for °ows of net foreign
assets, and it alone appears in the household budget constraint. Equations (12), (14) and
(15) are a®ected by the ¯nancial exchange rate through the domestic nominal interest rate
because, in the current period, one unit of domestic currency purchases 1=s0 units of foreign
currency, not 1=e0 units. I assume this purchase can only be repatriated the following period
at the rate s1. During the period, the 1=s0 units earn i¤
1=s0 units of interest income, so the
amount of foreign currency repatriated into domestic currency is i¤
1s1=s0. The combination
of these two returns leads to the following real UIP condition.
q0 (1 + r0) = q1 (1 + r
¤
0)=f0 (17)
where qt ´ et=Pt is the the real exchange rate and f0 ´ (s0=e0)=(s1=e1) measures the
wedge that distorts intertemporal consumption trade. Using the Fisher equation, (1 + i0) =
10Equivalent to the ¯rms decision I can write, wt=Ph;t = MRSt ´ ¡ul=uC.
6(1 + i¤
0)¿0, where ¿0 ´ s0=s1. Whenever the exchange rates are uni¯ed f0 = 1, so there is
no distortion, despite ¿0 6= 1. Whenever the commercial exchange rate is pegged ¿0 (= f0)
can be thought of as the distortion.
C. Government
The government consists of a central bank, an import-export authority (IEA), and an ex-
change rate authority (ERA). The central bank-cum-¯scal authority levies lump-sum taxes
and transfers, prints money and earns revenue from interest income on reserves. Printing
money, issuing credit, and reserve holdings are connected by a balance sheet condition,
Mt ¡ Mt¡1 = et ¢ ¢Rt + dt ¡ dt¡1 (18)
where Rt are foreign exchange reserves and dt is domestic credit. The exchange rate attached
to reserves is that associated with commercial transactions because the government is free
to enter the foreign exchange market without restriction. The central banks period budget
constraint is,
Tt = dt¡1 ¡ dt ¡ etRti
¤
t¡1 for t = 0;1 (19)
Intertemporally, central bank transfers, Tt, are constrained by the initial levels of the money
supply and reserves, seigniorage revenues and (interest) income lost due to issuing money.
The IEA restricts intratemporal trade in domestic and foreign goods, thereby eliminating the
possibility of arbitrage between the commercial and ¯nancial exchange rates.11 The ERA
restricts intertemporal trade. If a domestic resident wants to exchange one unit of period t
domestic output for foreign currency bonds in order to consume one unit of the period t + 1
foreign output, one unit of domestic output is taken to the ERA, who, in exchange for it's
11If a domestic resident wants to export one unit of the period t domestic output in exchange for one
unit of period t foreign output they take the unit of domestic output to the IEA, where its foreign currency
value is Ph;t=et. The foreign currency is then used to purchase foreign output, through the IEA, and at
the foreign currency price, P¤
f;t per unit. Agents hold foreign currency whilst interacting with the IEA
and are prevented from interacting with foreign residents directly. Domestic residents are also prevented
from obtaining foreign currency (at the exchange rate et) in order to buy foreign bonds (at the exchange
rate st) eliminating arbitrage possibilities. The IEA is not assumed to earn revenue for the government
despite its role as the economy's monopoly supplier of the foreign output. If it did this would be equivalent
to imposing a tari® on imports. See Fender and Yip (2000) for an analysis of goods market tari®s in a
sticky-price environment.
7domestic currency value, Ph;t, issues a credit of Ph;t=st units of foreign currency. Interest is
paid on the credit so that in period t + 1 the foreign bond pays back (1 + i¤
t)Ph;t=st units of
foreign currency and the domestic resident receives (1+ it)Ph;t units of domestic currency.12
The ERA generates revenue from these actions because in period t, for one unit of the do-
mestic output, Ph;t=st units of foreign currency are credited to the domestic resident. This
unit is sold to foreign residents for P ¤
h;t. Using the LOP assumption, the pro¯t made on the
transaction is [1 ¡ (et=st)]P ¤
h;t. The ERA buys back the foreign bond from the domestic res-
ident in period t+1 paying out domestic currency to the value of (1+i¤
t)(st+1=st)Ph;t=Pf;t+1
units of foreign output. The ERA then redeems the bond with the foreign issuers and
receives (1 + i¤
t)Ph;t=st units of foreign currency. But this amount of currency buys (1 +
i¤
t)(1=st)Ph;t=P ¤
f;t+1 units of foreign output on world markets and the pro¯t on the redemp-
tion is, (1 + it)[(st+1=et+1) ¡ 1]etP ¤
h;t.
Therefore, by setting st > et, the ERAs actions make it more expensive for domestic residents
to gain a credit of one unit of foreign output today than to actually buy and consume that
unit. But, by setting st+1 < et+1, domestic residents who cash in their bonds receive less,
in terms of foreign output, than the amount which the bonds would yield if domestic agents
were able to directly interact with foreign agents. Combining the general pro¯t level of the
ERA with the resources available to the domestic residents the ERA period constraint is,






for t = 0;1 (20)
This is the counterpart of the central bank's period constraint, and whenever st 6= et, private
bond holdings create revenue which is re°ected in the di®erence between domestic and foreign
rates of return on ¯nancial investments. However, as stressed before, it is the ratio of the
percentage change of the two exchange rates that distorts capital markets.
D. Equilibrium
The resource constraint is zt = Ct +
R 1
0 xt(j)dj. Using the intratemporal micro-demand
conditions, and the de¯nition of domestic GDP, the goods market equilibrium condition is,
ytPh;t = n(Ct + kt+1)Pt + etg
¤
t (21)
where kt+1 = xt and x1 = 0 such that future output on the demand-side is independent of
the level of investment.
12The ERA ¯nances this action by buying foreign bonds to the value Ph;t=st in period t.
8Wages are °exible, and an economy-wide supply curve relating output, consumption, and
capital holds each period.
yt = kt f[µ·=(µ ¡ 1)®]CtPt=Ph;tg
®=(®¡1) (22)
Both the goods and labor market equilibrium conditions link output, consumption and in-
vestment to relative prices. When the price is set one period in advance, in the current
period, and for a given stock of capital, (21) alone determines the level of output and g¤
t
can be thought of as a demand-shifter. To determine investment, factor demands need to
be included. In the future period, due to perfect foresight, the goods and labor market
equilibrium conditions, and factor demands, determine output.
Finally, solving the government and individual budget constraints forward, gives the national



























´ 1 when t = 0, and (R1 + B1) = 0
replaces the no Ponzi-game condition. From (23), the discounted sum of the trade balance
(evaluated using the foreign interest rate) is equal to the initial economy-wide net foreign
asset position.
3. Capital Controls
The central bank ¯xes the exchange rate through reserve transactions, and the IEA and
ERA segment the goods and bond markets so that the government can restrict the °ow of
private capital.13 As usual, the NIBC needs to hold, however, with capital controls, so does
a period national budget constraint (NBC). The NBC can be expressed in the following
way.
¢R = CA0 + ¢B (24)
This constraint has a very standard interpretation: the balance-of-payments, ¢R, equals
the sum of the current account, CA0, and the capital account, ¢B. As the initial level
13One might imagine there is a degree of imperfection in separation, which is more realistic. However,
for clarity, it is more natural to consider polar cases without speculating on the scope of government control
over goods and ¯nancial markets. Dornbusch (1988) explains this segmentation idea in greater detail.
9of economy-wide debt is zero, P hy¤
h;0 ¡ Pf;0yf;0, which is the trade balance, also measures
the current account, which we normally think of as, P hy¤
h;0 ¡ Pf;0yf;0 + i¤
¡1B¡1. When
P hy¤
h;0 > Pf;0yf;0, there is a current account surplus. The change in private agents holdings
of net foreign assets, B0¡B¡1, is now captured by B0. When B0 > 0 domestic residents buy
foreign bonds and there is a capital out°ow. When B0 < 0 domestic residents sell foreign
bonds and there is a capital in°ow. Above, ¢B ´ ¡B0, and thus, ¢B > 0 represents a
capital in°ow, and ¢B < 0 a capital out°ow.14 Finally, since reserves are used to ¯x the
exchange rate, CA0 6= ¢B. Above, R0 ¡ R¡1 = R0 ´ ¢R. If ¢R > 0, the government is
accumulating reserves, and the balance-of-payments is in surplus. When ¢R < 0, there is
a balance-of-payments de¯cit.15
The reserve position of the government also needs to be consistent with the central banks
balance sheet because reserve holdings are simply the sum of domestic credit and the money
supply, M0 = ¢R+D0. This implies the following condition holds when the aggregate °ow










+ (1 ¡ n)
¸
+ (1 ¡ n)Px0 ¡ (eg
¤
0 + D0) (25)
This condition implies there is an economy-wide (aggregate) limit to lending; ¢B cannot be
`too' negative. In particular, we cannot lend more than the sum of the economy's holdings
of current credit and the current level of exports in nominal terms; ¢B > ¡(eg¤
0 + D0).
Recall, eg¤
0 ¸ 0 is exogenous, as is D0 ¸ 0, but this is a policy variable. Thus, it is
possible for ¢B ! ¡1, but only if either exports are very high, or the level of credit
is expanded. It is permissible for ¢B ! +1 for any eg¤
0 ¸ 0, D0 ¸ 0; that is, the
government is not restricted in how much the economy borrows today (the extent of capital
in°ows). Finally, with unrestricted private capital °ows, the NIBC alone matters for the net
foreign asset position of the economy. When capital controls are imposed, money demand
becomes central to determining the behavior of output, through the NBC, which relates to
the balance-of-payments.
The determination of consumption and investment is more standard. Using the consump-
tion Euler and nominal UIP equations, the NIBC can be expressed in terms of current
consumption, the change in the ¯nancial exchange rate, and investment, consistent with the
14Likewise, ¢B > 0 is a capital account surplus, and ¢B < 0 a de¯cit.
15From this we can also write the NIBC as, ¡CA0 = CA1=(1 + i¤
0).
10intertemporal approach to modelling the current account. This only leaves investment de-
mand. The approach adopted in this paper is related to C¶ espedes et al. (2004), in that the
factor demand and price setting conditions are used to determine future nominal output as
a function of investment and the domestic nominal interest rate. Goods market equilibrium
then provides a second condition in these variables, once it is itself combined with the NIBC.
This second step is important because although, in aggregate, private agents holdings of net
foreign assets are determined by government policy, and therefore constrained by (25), at
the individual, level savings are determined endogenously.
A. IS, LM, and BP Schedules
Because the equilibrium conditions of the model are non-linear I describe the economy
through conditions linearized around the no-shock equilibrium.16 Output is demand con-
strained in the current period, so the goods market equilibrium condition and NIBC produce
an IS equation in output, investment and the domestic nominal interest rate. Since the do-
mestic interest rate is related, via UIP, to the tax on ¯nancial asset transactions, the IS
condition is written in the following way.
b y0 = ½g¤b g
¤ ¡ ½i¤b i
¤
0 + ½xb x0 + ½¿b ¿0 (26)
where a circum°ex denotes the percentage deviation from the no-shock equilibrium. The
coe±cients, which are functions of underlying structural parameters, and the policy variable,
¢B, lie between zero and one.17 The restriction ½x + ½g¤ = 1 holds for the IS parameters
because ¯rms have access to Cobb-Douglas technologies and the export shock is permanent.
Output is increasing in investment and exports and decreasing in the foreign interest rate
and the tax on foreign ¯nancial assets.
In linear form the BP equation has the following representation.
b x0 = b g
¤ ¡ ¸i¤b i
¤
0 + ¸¿b ¿0 (27)
16Since the focus of the analysis is on the initial impact of shocks I do not include the analysis of the
long-run here. Moreover, it seems natural to focus on the initial reaction of the economy (when output is
demand determined), given that capital controls are an inherently short-run phenomenon.
17Because the model is non-linear, it is not possible to solve explicitly for the no-shock equilibrium as
a function of ¢B. Thus ¢B pins down the models endogenous parameters implicity. Numerically, any
feasible ¢B produces a two values for ¿0. However, since ¿0 2 (0;1 + i¤
0), one solution can always be ruled
out.
11where ¸i¤ 2 (0;1) and ¸¿ > 0. Investment is increasing in exports and decreasing in the
foreign interest rate and the tax. Note that if, for example, b ¿0 were an exogenous policy
variable, the IS and BP equations would solve for output, with the BP alone determining
investment patterns.18 However, when goods and bond markets the separated, the third
condition required to pin down the equilibrium comes from the NBC and money demand.
Since output is demand constrained, the linear LM equation can be written in the following
way.
b y0 = Ág¤b g
¤ + Ái¤b i
¤
0 + Áxb x0 ¡ Á¿b ¿0 (28)
where all coe±cients lie between zero and one, except Ág¤ > 0. As optimization based
approaches to capital controls have tended to neglect the supply-side the most natural point
of comparison is with the Mundell-Fleming literature. In Flood and Marion (1982), for ex-
ample, money demand only depends on output and the interest rate.19 Here, the equivalent
condition, provides a link between government policy and the nominal interest rate, via the
NBC.
B. ISBP-AD Representation
The IS, LM, and BP equations are re-expressed as a two variable system to facilitate a com-
parison with the no capital controls case, which naturally forms a two variable system in b x0
and b y0. Absent capital controls, the BP determines investment, and the IS, given investment
demand, determines output. The LM equation need not be included as an equilibrium con-
dition because it only yields the level of money supply necessary for a particular equilibrium
to obtain. In (b x0;b y0) space, the BP schedule is °at, and the IS schedule is positively sloped.


















The ¡ and © coe±cients in this system depend on the structural parameters of the model





the structural parameters lie between zero and one and ¢B 2 (¡eg¤
0 ¡ D0;1).20 From the
18The BP curve would simply `shift' the BP curve up/down in investment-output space.
19Flood and Marion (1982) study dual exchange rates in a log-linear Mundell-Fleming model. Converting
to the notation in this paper, the equivalent condition is, c M0 ¡ b P0 = ®0 ¡ ®1b i0 + ®2b y0, where the ®'s are
independent of the economy's structure.
20The parameter £ is a combination of the monopoly markup and capital's share in production.




, where a > 0 measures monetary frictions, and plays
a role because of money demand. Given ©x and ¡x, it is also relatively straightforward to
depict the equilibrium in (b x0; b y0) space. The AD schedule is steeper than the 45 degree line,
i.e. ©x = (Áx + ½x (Á¿=½¿))=(1 + (Á¿=½¿)) 2 (0;1), since Áx and ½x are also both less than
one. The slope of the ISBP is determined by ¡x ´ ½x+(½¿=¸¿). The parameter ¡x also lies
between zero and one and, more importantly, it is possible to show that ¡x > ©x.21 Thus, in
(b x0;b y0) space, both the AD and ISBP schedules are steeper than the 45 degree line, are never
vertical, and the AD schedule is always steeper than the ISBP schedule. Finally, it should
be clear that the economy exhibits a key similarity to the Mundell-Fleming model under
capital controls - not only does the equilibrium depend non-trivially on the LM equation,
via aggregate demand, but the ISBP schedule is upward-sloped. The transformed BP
schedule is not derived using the LM equation, but is a consequence of the capital controls.
4. The Transmission of Foreign Shocks
Before discussing the transmission of export and interest rate shocks when there are capital
controls it is useful to clarify the transmission of these shocks when capital °ows are un-
restricted. A fall in exports reduces current consumption, which lowers output through a
Keynesian-type multiplier e®ect. Output is also a®ected through the goods market because
the terms of trade do not adjust to the shock, and investment demand falls. The changes in
consumption, investment, and output are proportional. Changes in the foreign interest rate
also a®ect current output through the savings and investment decisions of private agents.
It is worth noting that, as usual, the change in the foreign interest rate produces an income
and substitution e®ect. But under the simplifying assumption of a unit intertemporal sub-
stitution elasticity the result is unambiguous.22 Higher interest rates motivate agents to
increase their level of saving, and to invest less, both of which lead to a reduction in the
current level of output. The reaction of consumption and investment to changes in exports
and the foreign interest rate is standard, and consistent with the intertemporal approach to
the current account, originally emphasized in Sachs (1981).23
21See Appendix.
22Before the shock it is assumed that agents are neither borrowing nor lending.
23A related point is that agents decisions do not exhibit a pure savings-investment separation, even with
capital mobility. Consumption allocations in°uence investment decisions because the economy contains a
home-bias feature in the ¯nal goods technology, i.e. n 6= n¤. Home-bias is implicit in a small open economy
that trades in specialized outputs. In a model without home-bias (or with a single traded good), rt = r¤
t.
13A. Export Shocks
When capital °ows are restricted the domestic nominal interest rate is endogenous, and
for a given foreign interest rate, a higher domestic interest rate is consistent with a lower
value of ¿0. Any change in the domestic nominal interest rate can be thought of as an
increase in ¯nancial market distortions. A permanent fall in exports will always produce
a fall in investment, consumption, and output. However, the magnitude of the change in
these variables depends on whether the government chooses to impose a restriction on the
in°ow or out°ow of private capital. This policy decision also has a direct implication for
the change in the domestic interest rate that results from the shock. In particular, if the
government imposes capital in°ows, the interest rate falls when exports fall, whereas if it
imposes a capital out°ow, the interest rate rises. Thus, the magnitude of the change in
investment, consumption, and output are linked to the change in the domestic interest rate
that results from the export shock, which is e®ectively o®setting or reinforcing.
To understand how this mechanism works it useful to study the shock diagrammatically.
Consider the simplest case, where the government imposes ¢B = 0. The export shock will
shift both the ISBP and AD schedules, but the result will be a proportional change in output







¡x(b g¤ < 0)
©x(b g¤ < 0)
Figure 1: Fall in Exports
The proportional change in output and investment also occurs when private capital is un-
restricted. However, without capital controls, the domestic interest rate is not a®ected by
the shock. Here it is endogenous, and dependent on the source of the shock, but when a
policy of ¢B = 0 is adopted the interest rate is independent of the change in exports, and
this is why the capital mobility result is reproduced. Another way to interpret this result
is in terms of the elasticities of the ISBP and AD schedules, de¯ned in (29), which depend
explicitly on ¢B. For output to over react; that is, for output to fall by more than the drop
in exports, the following condition is required.
©g¤ + ©x =
Ág¤ + Áx + (Á¿=½¿)
1 + (Á¿=½¿)
> 1 (30)
That is, the sum of the elasticities of output with respect to export demand and investment
15that characterize the AD schedule have to be larger than one. This result is attractive if one
considers that the only additional equation in (29), versus the no capital controls case, is the
LM equation, which forms part of the AD schedule. In fact, it is clear that the elasticity
condition in (30) only requires Ág¤ +Áx > 1. In other words, it is the sum of the elasticities
of output with respect to export demand and investment arising in the money market that
determine whether output and investment mimic the no capital controls case with export
shocks.24 The elasticity condition relates directly to government policy because it is possible
to show, when ¢B < 0, Ág¤ +Áx > 1, and when ¢B < 0, the opposite holds. That is, when
the government chooses to force capital out°ows, the sum of the elasticities of output with
respect to export demand and investment in the money market are greater than one. In
this case, output over reacts to the export shock.
The intuitive explanation for this result can understood from the reaction of the interest
rate. Suppose the government chooses a policy of ¢B < 0. This implies that private
agents are forced to save. To induce this type of behavior the domestic interest rate has to
rise. But if this happens, consumption and investment fall. However, the drop in exports
already lowers consumption and investment, as in the case without capital controls. Thus,
the policy of ¢B < 0 exacerbates the impact of the shock. Likewise, if the government
picks a policy of ¢B > 0, the interest rate will fall, shielding output from the change in
exports. There is another important implication of this result, which can be understood
from the diagram. Suppose the government forces private out°ows of capital and output
over reacts to the shock. In this case, investment will be more variable than output, and
in terms of the diagram, we will always be below the 45-degree line. Thus, restrictions on
capital °ows may not only contribute to the variability of output when there are shocks to
exports, they can also a®ect the relationship between output and investment.
Under the form of capital controls studied here the government acts directly as the ¯nancial
intermediary because it holds a monopoly position in the supply of foreign bonds. Relative
to the case where capital °ows are unrestricted, this should o®er some protection form to
the domestic economy. However, this simple explanation turns out to be incorrect. One
important implication of the analysis is that adopting capital controls in the face of export
disturbances is a potentially bad idea in the sense that it may increase the variability of
24This requirement arises because the IS restriction, ½x + ½g¤ = 1, implies ¡x ¡ ¡g¤ = 1 in the ISBP
equation.
16output. At a minimum an important distinction can be drawn between the e®ects of in°ow
and out°ow restrictions. If countries do, as Reinhart and Rogo® (2004) suggest, adopt
dual exchange rate policies as a means to control the °ow of private capital, this result also
provides an interesting interpretation of the stylized fact that developing economies tend to
have more volatile levels of GDP than their industrialized counterparts. Since one argument
for capital controls is to insulate the economy from changes in foreign monetary conditions,
even if this works, it opens up the possibility of large swings in domestic output as a result
of export shocks.
B. Interest Rate Shocks
It is also often assumed that capital controls o®er insulation from changes in the foreign
interest rate. Without capital controls, changes in the foreign interest rate feed directly
through to the domestic economy, and given this, the argument that capital controls o®er
a form of `insulation' is relatively simple; by using a capital control the domestic nominal
interest rate is no longer pegged to the foreign nominal interest rate. However, despite the
use of capital controls, evidence of interest rate pass-through, such as that presented in Rogers
and Miniane (2007), suggests higher foreign interest rates result in a higher domestic interest
rates. Here, the same is true, and the pass-through has important implications because,
when the °ow of capital is unrestricted, a higher foreign interest rate has unambiguous
implications for consumption, investment, and output - all fall. That is not the case when
capital °ows are restricted, as an increase in the foreign interest rate has two e®ects on
consumption and output. There is a substitution e®ect away from current consumption
which leads to lower current output. But there is also an o®-setting or re-enforcing e®ect
depending on the net foreign asset position of the economy because a higher interest rate
makes the country either poorer or richer. Therefore, the reaction of consumption to changes
in the interest rate is similar to the reaction of an individual - the income e®ect of the change
implies that a borrower is hurt by the rise in interest rates, whilst a lender bene¯ts. That
is, consumption rises or falls with the shock, and this causes a potential ambiguity in the
reaction of output.
Again, we can link the reaction of the economy to the shock back to the parameter that
characterizes the AD schedule. In particular, it can be shown that the sign of ©i¤ depends





. When ¢R > ¢B the economy is a net international creditor, and ©i¤ > 0.












The overall impact of the shock is ambiguous, but it is clear that a large part of this arises
from the reaction of consumption. Again, it helps to consider a special case. When
¢R = ¢B output must fall when the foreign interest rate rises. Diagrammatically, only the







¡x(b i0 > 0)
Figure 2: Rise in the Foreign Interest Rate
It is clear from ¯gure two that the reason output falls when the foreign interest rate rises and
¢R = ¢B is that investment falls. The potential ambiguity in changes in output therefore
arise entirely from the income and substitution e®ects associated with consumption. It is also
clear, in this case, that b x0 > b y0, and as ¢R changes, for a given policy choice over private
capital °ows, the relationship between consumption, investment, and output is a®ected.
18This is an important result because it suggests that whilst capital controls can insulate
an economy from changes in the foreign interest rate this insulation only works through
aggregate demand. The governments holdings of foreign exchange also have implications
for the behavior of output. In the context of previous studies, Flood and Marion (1982) use
a stochastic Mundell-Fleming model and ¯nd that dual exchange rates provide full insulation
from foreign interest rate shocks. This possibility fails here and the use of capital controls
may have somewhat more severe consequences than previously thought.
One way to think about this result is through the non-linear NIBC, rewritten in terms of




(1 ¡ 1=¿0) =
1 X
t=0
CAt=[(1 + i0):::(1 + it¡1)] (31)
where (1 + i0):::(1 + it¡1) ´ 1 when t = 0. When ¿0 = 1, the domestic and foreign rates
of return are equalized, the left-hand side of this expression is zero, and discounting by
the domestic of foreign nominal interest rate is equivalent, because there is no distortion
in ¯nancial markets. However, when there is a capital control, the left-hand side of (31)
is zero only when the economy is neither a net creditor nor debtor internationally. In
response to the interest rate shock, ¿0 changes, and the net foreign asset position of the
economy a®ects wealth levels such that if, for example, the economy is a net creditor (¢R >
¢B), consumption rises, whilst investment falls. The wealth mechanism through which
consumption rises does not operate when there are shocks to exports. That reserves matter
for the macro consequences of interest rate shocks is particularly interesting. As Dollar
and Kraay (2006) note, in China, reserve accumulation has largely mirrored the in°ow of
capital, which, relative to wealth, as reached around 4%. Thus, China's zero net foreign
asset position re°ects debt °ows and FDI that have been roughly balanced by the central
banks accumulation of reserves. Given that China has a large number of capital controls in
place, this points to the possibility that China could be insulated from any change in global
interest rates.
5. Conclusion
This paper develops a general equilibrium model of a small open economy with physical
capital, monopolistic competition and sticky prices to understand the implications of capital
19controls. I show that the intertemporal equivalence between capital controls and dual
exchange rates extends to a more general equivalence between the Mundell-Fleming and
DGE approaches. The DGE economy has an upward-sloped balance-of-payments schedule
and money demand plays an important role in determining the behavior of output, despite
the exchange rate being ¯xed. As both of these features are a result of government policy,
at ¯rst glance, the model appears to be much like the textbook Mundell-Fleming model.
However, the economy di®ers from Mundell-Fleming in that budget constraints are imposed
on individual behavior and also dictate how government reserves respond to external shocks.
Some of the results contrast strongly to the standard logic which supposes that restrictions on
capital °ows help reduce output °uctuations in response to external shocks. If, as Reinhart
and Rogo® (2004) suggest, countries have been using capital controls by imposing a ¯nancial
exchange rate, the analysis points to an interesting explanation of why output in developing
economies is more volatile - capital controls themselves are a source of instability.
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22Appendix
Here I derive the ISBP-AD representation of the economy with capital controls, given by
equation (29). I start with the national budget constraint,
e
£











t ¡ (1 ¡ n)(­t + Ptxt)
where the intratemporal micro-demand conditions are imposed. I ¯rst make some simpli¯-
cations. Since R¡1 and B¡1 are given, I set them to zero, and since I consider permanent
changes in exports, g¤
0 = g¤
1 ´ g¤. Both the NIBC and NBC need to hold with capital




















M0 ¡ D0 = eg

























In the current period output is demand constrained. Using the goods market equilibrium





















Money demand needs to be consistent with the NBC, as in the main text. Combining this
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ae ¿0 + 1 ¡ n
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(33)
where e ¿0 ´ (1 + i¤
0)[(1 + i¤
0) ¡ ¿0]
¡1. To derive the BP equation, start with the future period
goods market equilibrium condition. Since x1 = 0,
y1Ph;1 = n­1 + eg
¤
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From the factor demand and price setting conditions,
k1Q1£ = y1Ph;1
where £ ´ µ=(µ ¡ 1)°. From the households capital and consumption choices, Q1 =
P (1 + i¤
0)=¿0. Combining these conditions and eliminating y1Ph;1, which is endogenous,






































I linearize the three conditions; (32), (33), and (34) around the no-shock equilibrium. IS:
b y0 = ½xb x0 + ½¿b ¿0 + ½g¤b g





















y0 (1 ¡ n)
n¿0
¿0 + ¯
with ½x 2 (0;1), because yPh = n(­+xP)+eg¤, and where all remaining terms on the right
hand side are positive. LM:
b y0 = Áxb x0 ¡ Á¿b ¿0 + Ág¤b g
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24with Áx;Ái¤ 2 (0;1) and Ág¤;Á¿ > 0. BP:
b x0 = b g
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with ¸¿ > 0 and ¸i¤ 2 (0;1). Combine (35) and (37). ISBP:
b y0 = ¡xb x0 ¡ ¡g¤b g
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where ½g¤ = 1 ¡ ½x implies ¡x = 1 + ¡g¤. Combine (35) and (36. AD:
b y0 = ©xb x0 + ©g¤b g

























Equations (38) and (39) form (29) in the main text.


































First, note ¡x > ©x > 0, and ¡g¤ > 0 ) ¡x > 1. Second, we can determine when b y0 > b g¤
because, in this case, (1 ¡ ¡x)(¡©x) + ¡x©g¤ > ¡x ¡ ©x, or,





















+ Ág¤ > 1 +
Á¿
½¿
Áx + Ág¤ > 1
which can be expressed as,
nq
(1¡n)=nx0ae ¿0 + q
1=ng
¤ (ae ¿0 + 1) > y0 [ae ¿0 + (1 ¡ n)]
However, we also know the goods market equilibrium condition holds, so the previous con-
dition reduces further, and only holds if ¢B + D0 < 0. Suppose D0 = 0. Then; (out°ows)
¢B < 0 =) overreact; (private autarky) ¢B = 0 =) equal change; (in°ows) ¢B > 0 =)
under react. Likewise, if b y0 > b g¤, it is also possible to show b x0 > b y0.























Here, ©i¤ measures the consumption response to the shock, and its sign depends on the net





























































as claimed in the text.
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